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COMMENTS
MULTIPLE-PUNISHMENT AND THE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE: THE UNITED
STATES v. URSERY DECISION
"No person shall be subject ... to more than one punishment or
one trial for the same offense."'
-James Madison
INTRODUCTION
Recently, the Double Jeopardy Clause has become a popular
means of challenging the actions of Government, resulting in
much debate and confusion with respect to its applicability in
certain contexts.2 In fact, even the Supreme Court has acknowl-
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451-52 (Joseph Gales, Jr. ed., 1789).
2 See United States v. McClinton, 98 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting
that civil penalty could get so large that it would amount to "punishment" for double
jeopardy purposes); United States v. Baird, 63 F.3d 1213 (3d Cir. 1995) (same), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 909 (1996); United States v. $405,089.23 in United States Cur-
rency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1222 (9th Cir. 1994), amended on denial of reh'g en banc, 56
F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995) (adopting "solely remedial" Halper rule to invalidate civil for-
feiture), rev'd sub nom., United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2149 (1996)
(rejecting "solely remedial" test of Halper and applying 89 Firearms test to conclude
no violation of double jeopardy); United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1465 (7th
Cir. 1994) (indicating in dicta agreement with Ninth Circuit); United States v. One
Single Family Residence, 13 F.3d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that criminal
action coupled with civil action does not violate double jeopardy); United States v.
Millan, 2 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1993) (same).
Ironically, this split among the circuits has likely resulted from the different in-
terpretations attributed to recent Supreme Court cases. See Witte v. United States,
115 S. Ct. 2199, 2206 (1995) (holding that consideration of uncharged criminal con-
duct in sentencing for charged offenses does not constitute punishment and will not
preclude subsequent prosecution of those uncharged offenses); Department of Reve-
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hue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 784 (1994) (holding that tax under
Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax Act constituted punishment for purposes of double
jeopardy); United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 712 (1993) (holding that defendant's
subsequent prosecutions violated double jeopardy); Austin v. United States, 509
U.S. 602, 614-15 (1993) (finding that enforcement of civil forfeiture statute which
was partially punitive in nature constituted punishment); United States v. Halper,
490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989) (holding that defendant who has been punished in
criminal prosecution may not be subject to additional civil sanction to extent that
second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial). An alarming amount
of litigation has been sprouting in the state courts regarding these cases. See, e.g.,
District Attorney of Kings County v. Iadarola, 623 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1995) (reporting that 147 state decisions cited Halper rule in early 1995), cert. de-
nied, 116 S. Ct. 1825 (1996).
Individuals have begun to challenge civil sanctions in novel areas as a result of
this split. For example, challenges on double jeopardy grounds have surfaced in the
context of drivers licenses, professional licensing, and business regulation. See Peo-
ple v. Marmon, 903 P.2d 651, 655 (Colo. 1995) (attorney discipline); State v. Zerkel,
900 P.2d 744, 757 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (arguing double jeopardy violation in con-
text of drivers license revocation); Tench v. Commonwealth, 462 S.E.2d 922, 925
(Va. Ct. App. 1995) (finding suspension and revocation of driver license did not con-
stitute punishment under Double Jeopardy Clause); Whittaker v. Dail, 567 N.E.2d
816, 817-18 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (invoking double jeopardy argument when defen-
dant convicted criminally and then sued in private lawsuit for damages), rev'd on
other grounds, 584 N.E.2d 1084 (1992); Kvitka v. Board of Registration in Med., 551
N.E.2d 915, 918 (Mass. 1990) (vacating fine imposed by medical licensing board fol-
lowing criminal conviction for dispensing illegal drugs).
This, in turn, has sparked debate among commentators regarding the validity
of such novel claims. See generally Anthony G. Hall, The Effect of Double Jeopardy
on Asset Forfeiture, 32 IDAHO L. REV. 527 (1996) (concluding that civil forfeiture
statutes generally have unique role in recovering criminal proceeds as well as many
other remedial purposes, and should not be subject to Double Jeopardy Clause con-
straints); Stephanie Ann Miyoshi, Note, Is the DUI Double-Jeopardy Defense D.O.A.,
29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1273 (1996) (arguing that confiscation of driver's license in
connection with DUI stop is not punishment and therefore should not preclude sub-
sequent criminal proceedings against offender); Carlos F. Ramirez, Note, Adminis-
trative License Suspensions, Criminal Prosecutions and the Double Jeopardy Clause,
23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 895 (1996) (same).
Another explanation for the resurgence of double jeopardy claims is the per-
ception that civil forfeiture imposes overly harsh penalties. For an excellent discus-
sion of this phenomenon, see LEONARD W. LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: FORFEITURE
OF PROPERTY; 1-81 (1996); see also Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using
Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcend-
ing the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1991) (noting that
increasing use of civil forfeiture as method of law enforcement will present chal-
lenges to legal system premised upon distinction between civil and criminal mat-
ters); Stanley E. Cox, Halper's Continuing Double Jeopardy Implications: A Thorn
by Any Other Name Would Prick as Deep, 39 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 1235, 1247 (1995)
(arguing that all civil forfeiture, regardless of severity or purpose, must be treated
as punishment for purposes of double jeopardy jurisprudence); Jon E. Gordon, Note,
Prosecutors Who Seize Too Much and the Theories They Love: Money Laundering,
Facilitation, and Forfeiture, 44 DuKE L.J. 744, 768-75 (1995) (suggesting that in or-
der to avoid excessive forfeitures, some limits should be placed upon prosecutor's
power to seize property); Tamara R. Piety, Comment, Scorched Earth: How the Ex-
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edged the difficulty that double jeopardy issues present, refer-
ring to the Clause as "a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not
fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator."3 Lately,
particular interest has arisen regarding the question of multiple-
punishment and double jeopardy.4 Specifically, one issue which
has arisen is whether a drug prosecution and civil forfeiture ac-
tion instituted by the Government against an individual in con-
nection with the same underlying offense violates the Double
Jeopardy Clause.5
This Comment seeks to navigate this so-called "Sargasso
Sea" of double jeopardy jurisprudence and to answer the ques-
pansion of Civil Forfeiture Doctrine Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 911, 963-77 (1991) (noting that civil forfeiture is outmoded in modem society
and that it often leads to imposition of punishment on blameless individuals who are
left without recourse to constitutional violations); Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Tainted
Cash or Easy Money?, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., June 14, 1992, at Al (suggesting
civil forfeiture may be used as weapon of prejudice against minorities); Bullock, Fill-
ing the Coffers with Civil Forfeitures, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 1, 1993, at 32 (arguing
that civil forfeiture is abused on both state and federal level, often infringing upon
individual constitutional rights).
3 Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981); see also Barbara A. Mack,
Double Jeopardy--Civil Forfeitures and Criminal Punishment: Who Determines
What Punishments Fit the Crime, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 217, 251 (1996) (criticizing
Supreme Court decisions as being "inconsistent, confusing, and result-orientated");
William S. McAninch, Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy, 44 S.C. L. REV. 411,
413 (1993) (describing Double Jeopardy Clause as "numbingly complex"); Note,
Twice In Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 264 (1965) (referring to law of double jeopardy
as "fictions and rationalizations" that are "characteristic signs of doctrinal senility").
4 See supra note 2; infra part I (discussing recent Supreme Court decision). See
generally Angela Anderson, Asset Forfeiture as Double Jeopardy, 32 IDAHO L. REV.
545 (1996); James A. Bell, IV & Todd Richman, Double Jeopardy, 84 GEO. L.J. 1076
(1996); Mack, supra note 3; Stephanie H. McClain, Note, Running the Gauntlet: An
Assessment of the Double Jeopardy Implications of Criminally Prosecuting Drug Of-
fenders and Pursuing Civil Forfeiture of Related Assets under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4),
(6) and (7), 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 941 (1995); Andrew L. Subin, The Double Jeop-
ardy Implications of In Rem Forfeiture of Crime-Related Property: The Gradual Re-
alization of a Constitutional Violation, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 253 (1996).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Sardone, 94 F.3d 1233, 1235 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding
Double Jeopardy Clause was not violated when civil forfeiture action and criminal
prosecution proceedings were initiated against defendant for underlying drug
charges); United States v. Gonzalez, 76 F.3d 1339, 1343 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding civil
forfeiture of real estate for transporting drugs always constitutes punishment and
renders subsequent criminal prosecution in violation of Double Jeopardy Clause);
United States v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551, 553 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding civil forfeiture of
drug proceeds is not punishment for purposes of Double Jeopardy Clause and would
not bar subsequent criminal prosecution); Torres, 28 F.3d at 1465 (same); Millan, 2
F.3d at 20 (noting that civil forfeiture action was part of single coordinated prosecu-
tion of defendants and, therefore, settlement did not constitute bar to future crimi-
nal proceedings for same underlying drug offenses).
19971
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tion of whether such dual proceedings are permissible under the
Double Jeopardy Clause. This Comment will focus on the recent
Supreme Court decision of Ursery v. United States6 in which the
Court held that such dual proceedings do not violate double jeop-
ardy because civil forfeiture actions do not "punish" a defendant.
7
In analyzing this opinion, Part I(a) recounts the procedural his-
tory and facts of the case, while Part I(b) explains how the Court
arrived at its decision. Part II argues, through emphasis of the
Court's prior decisions in United States v. Halper and Austin v.
United States,9 that the Ursery Court erred in its application of
the appropriate standard of review. Part III suggests that the
Halper proportionality test should have been applied in Ursery,
and all civil forfeiture cases in general, because it more effec-
tively balances the benefits of civil forfeiture against the consti-
tutional prohibition of double jeopardy. This Comment concludes
that the Supreme Court has erred in failing to recognize that the
Double Jeopardy Clause protects against certain civil forfeitures.
I. URSERY v. UNITED STATES
A. Procedural History and Facts
Ursery involved two separate appeals which were consoli-
dated on review by the Supreme Court."0 The first case involved
the discovery, by Michigan police, of marijuana plants growing
on defendant Guy Ursery's property." The United States com-
menced a civil forfeiture action against defendant's house, pur-
suant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), 2 alleging that it had been used to
facilitate the processing and distribution of marijuana. 3 Shortly
before the settlement of the civil forfeiture action, criminal
116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
7 Id. at 2149.
8 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
9 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
'o Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2138; see United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir.
1995); United States v. $405,089.23 in United States Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th
Cir. 1994).
" Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2138.
'2 Section 881(a)(7) of Title 21 subjects to forfeiture "[a]lU real property ... which
is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the
commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one years
imprisonment...." 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(7) (West 1996).
13 Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2139.
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charges were filed against Ursery.'4 Thereafter, the United
States prosecuted and a jury convicted the defendant of various
drug violations. 5 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
Ursery's criminal conviction, holding that in light of the civil for-
feiture settlement, the criminal conviction violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause because it imposed a second "punishment."1
6
The second case involved defendants Wesley Arlt and James
Wren, who were convicted on an assortment of drug and money
laundering charges.'7 Prior to the commencement of the criminal
trial, the United States filed a civil in rem complaint against
various property owned by Arlt and Wren, including
$ 405,089.23 in cash, pursuant to civil forfeiture statutes 18
U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A)18 and 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). 9 Upon agree-
ment of the parties, the civil action was stayed until the conclu-
sion of the criminal prosecution." Both defendants were subse-
quently convicted of the criminal charges. More than one year
after their criminal prosecution, the Government was granted
summary judgment on the civil forfeiture proceeding.2' On ap-
peal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
the civil forfeiture constituted a second "punishment" and there-
fore violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.'
The Supreme Court granted the Government's petition for
certiorari in each of the two cases, reversing both decisions by an
8-1 vote.2
14 Id.
Id. Specifically, defendant was indicted, convicted, and sentenced to 63
months in prison for growing marijuana. Id.
"' Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2138.
17Id.
Section 981(a)(1)(A) provides for the forfeiture of property "involved in"
money laundering violations. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (1994).
19 Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2138. Section 881(a)(6) provides for the forfeiture of "[all
moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or in-
tended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in vio-
lation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys
used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter...." 21
U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(6) (West 1996). This provision is designed to disgorge three types
of proceeds: (1) proceeds acquired from the selling of narcotics; (2) proceeds intended
to be used to buy narcotics; and (3) proceeds used or intended to be used to facilitate
violations of the drug laws. See McClain, supra note 4, at 942 n.5.
"0 Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2139.
21 Id.
"United States v. $405,089.23 in United States Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1222
(9th Cir. 1994); see also Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 1239.
2 Ursery, 116 S. Ct at 2139.
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B. Reasoning of the Majority
In the majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
the Court held that the criminal prosecution and the in rem civil
forfeiture action did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause be-
cause the civil forfeiture statutes in question did not impose
"punishment" on the defendants.24 In reaching this conclusion,
the majority relied on a two-fold argument. First, that Congress
historically authorized the Government to bring both a criminal
action and a civil forfeiture action based on the same event;25 and
second, that precedent affirmed this understanding.26
The Chief Justice began the opinion by stating that "[s]ince
the earliest years of this Nation, Congress has authorized the
Government to seek parallel in rem civil forfeiture actions and
criminal prosecutions based upon the same underlying events."27
To support this proposition, the Court cited the 1931 case of
Various Items of Personal Property v. United States,28 which was
"[o]ne of the first cases to consider the relationship between the
Double Jeopardy Clause and civil forfeiture."29 In Various Items,
the defendant had been convicted of failing to pay taxes on cer-
tain alcoholic beverages in violation of federal law." Following
his conviction, the Government instituted a civil forfeiture action
against the defendant's distillery, warehouse, and denaturing
plant.3' The defendant argued that the civil forfeiture action
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.32 The Court, rejecting this
argument, resorted to a legal fiction and concluded that since an
in rem civil forfeiture action proceeds against the property, as
opposed to an in personam civil action, which proceeds against
the wrongdoer, the multiple-punishment prong of the Double
Jeopardy Clause was not violated as the wrongdoer was not be-
ing punished twice.33
Building on this rationale, the Ursery Court next turned its
24 Id. at 2149.
25 Id. at 2140 (citing Act of July 31, 1789; The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1,
14-15 (1827)).
26 Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2139-41.
27 Id. at 2140.
282 U.S. 577 (1931).
29 Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2140.
20 Various Items, 282 U.S. at 579.
"' Id. at 578.
2 Id. at 579.
"Id. at 581 (citing Origet v. United States, 125 U.S. 240, 245-47 (1888)).
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attention to the case of One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One
Ring v. United States,' which it cited as affirming the rule of
Various Items.35 In One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, the defendant
was prosecuted and later acquitted for smuggling jewels into the
United States. The Government then instituted forfeiture pro-
ceedings against the jewels.37 In rejecting the defendant's double
jeopardy argument, the Court held that the in rem civil forfeiture
action did not criminally punish the defendant because no second
in personam penalty was sought.38
Lastly, the Ursery Court turned to what it called its "most
recent decision"39 in the area; namely, the case of United States v.
One Assortment of 89 Firearms.4" In that case, the defendant
had been acquitted of various criminal weapons charges when
the Government commenced a civil forfeiture action against the
firearms the defendant had possessed.4' The Court, in rejecting
defendant's double jeopardy challenge, introduced a two-prong
test to determine whether a civil sanction constituted
"punishment" for the purposes of double jeopardy.42 The first
34 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (per curiam).
Ursery v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2141 (1996).
'6 One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. at 232-33.
:7 Id. at 233. Specifically, the defendant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. §
545 and section 497 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Id. It should be noted that while 18
U.S.C. § 545 provided for both civil forfeiture and criminal prosecution for the same
underlying transaction, section 497 of the Tariff Act provided exclusively civil pen-
alties. See id. at 232 n.1, 233 n.2.
' Id. at 235 ("If for no other reason, the forfeiture is not barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it involves neither two criminal
trials nor two criminal punishments.").
'9 Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2141.
40 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
41 Id. at 356 (noting that civil forfeiture action was brought pursuant to 18
U.S.C. §924(d)). Title 18 U.S.C. 924(d)(1) provides, "[a]ny firearm or ammunition
involved in or used in any knowing violation of ... section 922, ... or any violation of
any other criminal law of the United States, ... where such intent is demonstrated
by clear and convincing evidence, shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture" 18
U.S.C.S. 924(d)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1996).
42 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 362-63 (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,
248 (1980)). The two part Ward test is actually a combination of two separate tests
set forth in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. 232 and Flemming v. Nestor, 363
U.S. 603 (1960). In One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, the Court analyzed the legislative
intent in order to determine whether the statute created remedial civil sanctions or
criminal punishments. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. at 236-37. In Flem-
ming, the Court conducted an extended analysis to ensure that even though the
statute was characterized as remedial, it did not have the actual effect of being so
punitive as to render the statute unconstitutional under the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Flemming, 363 U.S. at 613-21.
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prong required a court to examine Congress' intent and to in-
quire whether the statute in question was designed as a reme-
dial civil sanction.43 The second prong asked "whether the statu-
tory scheme [was] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to
negate Congress' intention to establish a civil remedial mecha-
nism.""
Applying this test to the case at bar, the Ursery Court con-
cluded that Congress clearly envisioned both 21 U.S.C. § 881 and
18 U.S.C. § 981 as civil penalties.45 The Court noted that forfei-
ture is, by law, an in rem action that has "traditionally been
viewed as [a] civil proceeding, with jurisdiction dependent upon
seizure of a physical object."46 The Court further pointed to vari-
ous procedural mechanisms in support of this conclusion."
With regard to the second prong of inquiry, the Court con-
cluded that "there [was] little evidence, much less the 'clearest
proof that we require... suggesting that forfeiture proceedings ...
[were] so punitive in form and effect as to render them criminal
despite Congress' intent to the contrary."48  First, the Court
noted that forfeiture serves the remedial goals of both encourag-
ing owners to prevent their property from being used in drug ac-
tivities and to ensure that persons do not profit from the pro-
ceeds of illegal drug transactions.49  The Court next cited to
- 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 363.
44 Id. at 365 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49). The Flemming Court noted,
however, that "only the clearest proof could suffice to establish the unconstitutional-
ity of a statute on such a ground." Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617.
45 Ursery v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2147 (1996). The Court found that
the procedural mechanisms in the forfeiture statutes demonstrated Congress' intent
that the forfeitures be remedial in nature. Id.
46 Id. (quoting 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 363).
47 See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147-48. For example, the Court noted that, under
either statute "actual notice of the impending forfeiture is unnecessary when the
Government cannot identify any party with an interest in the seized article ... [and]
that seized property is subject to forfeiture through a summary administrative pro-
cedure if no party files a claim to the property." Id.
48 Id. at 2148 (internal citations omitted). The Court found the statutes appli-
cable in Ursery to be "indistinguishable from those reviewed, and held not to be pu-
nitive, in Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones, and 89 Firearms." Id.
49 Id.; see also 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 364 (noting forfeiture statute "furthers
broad remedial aims" by "furthering the prophylactic purposes of the 1968 gun con-
trol legislation by discouraging unregulated commerce in firearms .... "); Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687 (1974) (stating forfeiture
"fosters the purposes served by the underlying criminal statutes, both by preventing
further illicit use of the [property] and by imposing an economic penalty, thereby
rendering illegal behavior unprofitable.").
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Various Items, Emerald Stones and 89 Firearms, as well as a
string of federal forfeiture statutes, to support its view that his-
torically "in rem civil forfeiture has not ... been regarded as
punishment ... under the Double Jeopardy Clause."" Lastly, the
Court noted that civil forfeiture should not be considered puni-
tive because it required no showing of scienter 1
In short, the Ursery Court concluded that defendants' double
jeopardy rights had not been violated because the civil forfeiture
statutes in question did not impose "punishment" on defendants
under what it deemed to be the controlling 89 Firearms stan-
dard. 2 Consequently, the Court reversed the decisions of both
the Sixth and Ninth Circuits."3
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Double Jeopardy Clause
The Double Jeopardy Clause simply states: "[Nlor shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb."' This clause has been understood to protect
against three distinct abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the
same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the
same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for
the same offense.55 At issue, when the Government commences a
60 Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2149.
r" Id. But see Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 619 (1993) (stating that "the
inclusion of innocent-owner defenses ... reveals a congressional intent to punish
only those involved" in a criminal enterprise, and that the exemptions "serve to fo-
cus the provisions on the culpability of the owner in a way that makes them look
more like punishment, not less.").
12 Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2149.
3 Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989) (citing North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)); see also United States v. Dixon, 509
U.S. 688, 696 (1993) (noting that Double Jeopardy Clause applies to both successive
prosecutions and multiple punishments); Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415 (1980)
(noting three separate guarantees granted by Double Jeopardy Clause). The princi-
ple justification against reprosecution is to protect persons against erroneous con-
victions, increased sentences, continued embarrassment, and the expense of litiga-
tion. See Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498-99 (1984); Serfass v. United States, 420
U.S. 377, 388 (1975); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957); see also
Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982) ("Repeated prosecutorial sallies would un-
fairly burden the defendant and create a risk of conviction through sheer govern-
mental perseverance.").
The justification for multiple-punishment protection is to confine a court's sen-
1997]
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drug prosecution and a parallel civil forfeiture action, is the
multiple-punishment protection of the third prong because civil
forfeiture may "punish" a defendant.56
Despite arguments to the contrary,57 the history behind the
enactment of the Double Jeopardy Clause provides few answers
to the specific question of whether double jeopardy protects an
individual against the institution of both a criminal prosecution
and a civil in rem action against that individual's property for
the same illegal act.5" Nonetheless, it is well established that the
Double Jeopardy Clause bars the Government from twice pun-
ishing an individual for the same underlying event in separate
proceedings.59 Any logical inquiry of the multiple-punishment
prong, therefore, must examine the purpose of civil forfeiture to
determine whether it serves remedial or punitive goals. ° If a
tencing discretion to the limits specified by the legislature. Johnson, 467 U.S. at
499.
" See, e.g., Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2139; Halper, 490 U.S. at 441 (examining
whether statutory penalty under False Claims Acts constitutes penalty when added
to criminal penalty and fine already assessed).
" See Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 798
(1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Double Jeopardy Clause protects against
successive prosecutions, not successive punishments).
' See Mack, supra note 3, at 220 (noting that statutory roots of double jeopardy
are unclear). Early versions of the Double Jeopardy Clause from Colonial State Con-
stitutions indicate that double jeopardy historically applied only to criminal prose-
cutions. Id, at 221. Adoption of the Double Jeopardy Clause as written today, how-
ever, is less clear and may not be restricted to criminal offenses. Id. at 221-22.
"9 See supra note 56. However, the multiple-punishment prong of the Double
Jeopardy Clause does not bar a Government from seeking cumulative punishments
in the same proceeding provided that the legislature has authorized and intended
such cumulative punishment. Halper, 490 U.S. at 451 n.10. (noting that Govern-
ment may seek criminal penalty and civil penalty in same proceeding); see also
Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 788-805 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Double Jeop-
ardy Clause does not preclude multiple punishments in separate proceedings).
6 See Halper, 490 U.S. at 447-49 (explaining need for court to examine whether
sanctions are remedial or for deterrent or retributive purposes); United States v.
One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362 (1984) ("The question, then, is
whether a ... forfeiture proceeding is intended to be, or by its nature necessarily is,
criminal and punitive, or civil and remedial."); see also Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2146-47
(reviewing need to determine if punishment is punitive or remedial); Kurth Ranch,
511 U.S. at 777 (applying Halper language).
In order for civil forfeiture to violate double jeopardy, a court must not only
conclude that a person has been punished, but also that this punishment was im-
posed as part of the same underlying event commenced in separate proceedings. See
Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 213940. The Ursery court, however, did not have to address
the issues of whether civil forfeiture should be considered the "same offense" and
"same proceeding" because it held that civil forfeiture does not constitute
"punishment." Id. at 2149. For a discussion of these issues not addressed in Ursery,
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civil forfeiture statute is characterized as remedial, the action
does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the defen-
dant has not twice been "punished."61 If, however, a civil forfei-
ture statute is characterized as punitive, then the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause is violated whenever the Government brings both a
criminal prosecution and, either before or after, a civil forfeiture
action. 2
The legislative history behind civil forfeiture statutes sup-
plies compelling evidence that Congress created civil forfeiture
for the express purpose of serving certain "punitive goals."" But
see United States v. $405,089.23 in United States Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th
Cir. 1994) (holding that criminal prosecution and civil forfeitures are separate pro-
ceedings), rev'd on other grounds, Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996). But see United
States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that criminal prosecutions do
not constitute separate proceedings for parallel civil forfeiture actions for double
jeopardy purposes); United States v. One Single Family Residence, 13 F.3d 1493,
1499 (11th Cir. 1994) (same).
This Comment addresses only the first issue of whether civil forfeiture
"punishes" an individual. It is suggested, however, this issue is the most difficult to
resolve. If the Supreme Court revisits this issue and holds that civil forfeiture con-
stitutes "punishment," courts would have much less difficulty concluding that crimi-
nal prosecutions and civil forfeiture punish for the same underlying offense in sepa-
rate proceedings. See $405,089.23 in United States Currency, 33 F.3d at 1218-1222
(tracing civil forfeiture debate); United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 572-75 (6th
Cir. 1995) (finding civil forfeiture constitutes punishment and that civil and criminal
sanctions are not same offenses or proceedings), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996); see
also McClain, supra note 4, at 958-974 (reasoning that civil forfeiture and criminal
prosecution are separate proceedings that punish for same offense); Subin, supra
note 4, at 270-77 (same).
61 See Halper, 490 U.S. at 448 ("[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said
solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving
either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment .... "); 89 Firearms, 465 U.S.
at 362 ("Unless the forfeiture sanction was intended as punishment, so that the pro-
ceeding is essentially criminal in character, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not ap-
plicable.").
62See supra note 60; see also United States v. Mayers, 897 F.2d 1126, 1127
(11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (applying same test whether civil penalty or criminal
punishment comes first), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 865 (1990).
See S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 191 (1983) (commentating with respect to 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(7) that "the traditional criminal sanctions of fine and imprisonment are in-
adequate to deter or punish the enormously profitable trade in dangerous drugs").
This statute was enacted as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976-85. The Senate Report accompanying the Act
did not distinguish between civil and criminal forfeiture, referring to forfeiture as
an additional sanction to penalize crimes for which traditional penalties prove in-
adequate. S. Rep. No. 98-225.
With respect to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), the Joint Explanatory Statement submit-
ted to Congress explicitly recognized "the penal nature of forfeiture statutes." 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9518, 9522. The sponsor of the bill, Senator Nunn, stated in a speech
that:
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this finding alone is not dispositive." Although civil forfeiture
may violate double jeopardy, it does so not because the statute
serves certain punitive goals; rather, the Supreme Court, in
Halper, has enunciated a test requiring a court to ask whether
the civil statute "may not fairly be characterized as remedial."65
This test requires a court to undertake a proportionality analysis
to determine whether a sanction is so large, as compared to gov-
ernmental and societal costs, that the sanction can no longer be
fairly explained as serving remedial goals.66 Only when the civil
forfeiture statute cannot fairly be said to serve a remedial pur-
pose does the civil sanction violate double jeopardy. 7
Notably, the Ursery Court chose not to apply the Halper
proportionality test,68 but instead indicated that a court should
The criminal justice system can only be effective if there is a meaningful
deterrent .... The amendment I propose here today is intended to enhance
the efforts to reduce the flow of illicit drugs in the United States by strik-
ing out against the profits from illicit drug trafficking .... Thus, the puni-
tive and deterrent purposes of the Controlled Substances Act would have
greater impact on drug trafficking.
124 Cong. Rec. 23055 (July 27, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Nunn.).
The Supreme Court also has recognized the punitive nature of in rem forfei-
ture. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 614 (1993) ("Our cases ... have recog-
nized that statutory in rem forfeiture imposes punishment.").
On a slightly different note, the application of the tests set forth in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martrinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) and United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242
(1980) [hereinafter "Kennedy/Ward factors"] also support a finding that civil forfei-
ture is punitive. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49 (stating two-part test used to deter-
mine whether sanction is punitive or remedial); Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (listing
factors used to test whether sanction is penal in nature). The inclusion of an inno-
cent owners defense indicates that the culpability of an owner is relevant. See Ward,
448 U.S. at 248 (listing first part of two-part test to determine if sanction is punitive
in nature); Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168 (espousing factors relevant in determining
when nominally civil actions may be properly considered punitive). For an alterna-
tive application of the Kennedy/Ward factors, see Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2149
(concluding that factors support finding that civil forfeiture is not criminal).
' See Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49 (holding that relevant test is whether
.sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial").
6" Halper, 490 U.S. at 449.
66 Id. Specifically, the Court stated, "[wihere a defendant previously has sus-
tained a criminal penalty and the civil penalty sought in the subsequent proceeding
bears no rational relation to the goal of compensating the Government for its loss,
but rather appears to qualify as 'punishment' in the plain meaning of the word, then
... the penalty sought in fact constitutes a second punishment." Id. at 449-50. For
example, the Court noted in Halper that the civil penalty of $130,000 bore no ra-
tional relation to the actual damages suffered or the $16,000 of expenses incurred by
the Government in apprehending and prosecuting defendant. Id. at 452.
67 Id. at 448-49.
Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2145. The Court in Ursery first applied the two-prong 89
Firearms test, then applied the Kennedy/Ward factors. Id. at 2147-49. Prior to this
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apply the 89 Firearms two-prong test.69 It is submitted that the
Ursery Court erred in failing to recognize the universal applica-
bility of the Halper proportionality test to all civil sanctions, in-
cluding in rem civil forfeiture actions, and therefore erred in
failing to apply Halper to the facts of Ursery.
B. Halper and Austin
Halper involved a defendant who had been convicted under
the false-claims statute for submitting sixty-five inflated Medi-
care claims.7" Following his conviction, the Government com-
menced a civil action against defendant which imposed a fine of
$2,000 per violation of the false-claims statute.7 The district
court concluded that because the defendant's liability under the
civil penalty was $130,000, as compared to the Government's es-
timated loss plus $16,000 in costs to prosecute the case, the civil
penalty constituted a second "punishment" against the defendant
in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.72 The Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's decision, stating:
[we therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy Clause a de-
fendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecu-
tion may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the
extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized
as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.73
decision, however, many courts were indeed reading Halper to require a propor-
tionality analysis in determining whether an in rem forfeiture action was punitive
or remedial. See United States v. Borromeo, 1 F.3d 219, 221 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating
that "an inquiry into the proportionality between the value of the instrumentality
sought to be forfeited and the amount needed to effectuate the legitimate remedial
purposes of the forfeiture would seem to be in order"); Johnson v. State, 882 S.W.2d
17, 19-20 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (applying proportionality analysis to determine
"whether the forfeiture amount approximates the cost of investigating, apprehend-
ing, and prosecuting the defendant, or whether the forfeiture relates otherwise to
any actual damages that the defendant caused the state"); see also Smith v. United
States, 76 F.3d 879, 882-83 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding drug proceeds by definition di-
rectly proportional to the loss to government and society); United States v. Tilley, 18
F.3d 295, 299 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding forfeiture not disproportionate to costs to gov-
ernment and society); United States v. Certain Real Property and Premises Known
as 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1992) (evaluating sanction
against value obtained by criminal conduct).
" Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147-48; see also supra notes 40-42 and accompanying
text (describing elements of 89 Firearms two-prong test).
70 Halper, 490 U.S. at 437.
7' Id. at 438. The defendant was charged with violating 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982).
Id.
72 Halper, 490 U.S. at 438-39.
7' Id. at 448-49 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Court further noted
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In the case of Austin v. United States,"4 the defendant was
convicted of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute.75 Fol-
lowing his conviction, the Government initiated a civil forfeiture
proceeding against his mobile home and auto shop, contending
that they were "used" or were "intended for use" in the commis-
sion of a drug offense.76 Defendant contested the forfeiture on
the ground of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment.77 The Court, in considering whether the Excessive Fines
Clause was violated, asked whether the forfeiture statutes
"punished" the defendant for purposes of the Eighth Amend-
ment.78 The Court concluded that "forfeiture under [the statutes]
constitutes 'payment to a sovereign as punishment for some of-
fense', ... and, as such, is subject to the limitations of the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause."79
Read together, the Austin and Halper decisions" have been,
that:
the labels "criminal" and "civil" are not of paramount importance. It is
commonly understood that civil proceedings may advance punitive as well
as remedial goals, and, conversely, that both punitive and remedial goals
may be served by criminal penalties. The notion of punishment, as we
commonly understand it, cuts across the division between the civil and the
criminal law, and for the purposes of assessing whether a given sanction
constitutes multiple punishment barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause,
we must follow the notion where it leads.
Id. at 447-48. (footnotes omitted).
74 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
' Id. at 604.
76 Id. at 604-05. The government proceeded against the property pursuant to 21
U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7). Id.
7 Id. Specifically, the Eighth Amendment provides "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
78 Austin, 509 U.S. at 617.
71 Id. at 622. Specifically, the Court noted that "forfeiture generally and statu-
tory in rem forfeiture in particular historically have been understood, at least in
part, as punishment." Id. at 618. The Court also pointed out that "[tihe legislative
history of § 881 confirms the punitive nature of these provisions." Id. at 620. Thus,
"[in light of the historical understanding of forfeiture as punishment, the clear fo-
cus of [the statutes] on the culpability of the owner, and the evidence that Congress
understood those provisions as serving to deter and to punish," the Court concluded
that the statutes clearly imposed "punishment" on a defendant. Id. at 621-22.
80 Kurth Ranch also supports the use of the Halper proportionality test. In
Kurth Ranch, the Court considered whether a state tax imposed on marijuana was
invalid under the Double Jeopardy Clause when a taxpayer had already been crimi-
nally convicted of marijuana possession. Department of Revenue of Montana v.
Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994). The Court held that although the state had
labeled the civil sanction a "tax," the question must be asked whether the tax was so
punitive as to constitute punishment subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at
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and should continue to be, read by courts as adopting a propor-
tionality analysis for the purpose of determining whether a stat-
ute "punishes" an individual. Applying these principles to the
facts of Ursery, it necessarily follows that defendant Ursery was
"punished" twice when nearly half the equity in his real property
had been forfeited for growing marijuana on his property. As
Justice Stevens noted in his dissent," no evidence was intro-
duced establishing that the house was purchased with the pro-
ceeds of drug sales.82 In fact, the evidence showed that defen-
dant had not sold marijuana for profit, but rather grew and used
the drugs for home consumption.' Under these facts, it is very
difficult to understand how the defendant lost his home without
characterizing the forfeiture as "punishment."" It seems abun-
dantly clear that Ursery's civil sanction could not be fairly char-
1945. Applying this analysis, the Court concluded that the tax was indeed punitive,
and therefore subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 1948.
"' United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2152 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens argued that different forfeiture
statutes may require different treatment. Therefore, Justice Stevens divided forfei-
ture statutes into three different categories according to the type of property that
was being forfeited. The three categories are: (1) proceeds, (2) contraband, and (3)
"property that has played a part in the commission of a crime." Id. at 2152. Justice
Stevens believed that Ursery's house did not fall into any of these categories. In
Ursery, the evidence showed that the house was not purchased with the proceeds of
drug sales and, in fact, the defendant only used the marijuana for his own private
consumption. Id. at 2158-59.
Conversely, Stevens agreed with the majority regarding the second situation
before the Court in which the U.S. government seized $405,089.23 of proceeds from
a felonious drug transaction. Id. at 2152. Such confiscation is a remedial mechanism
which places a criminal back in the position he or she would have been in had he or
she not undertaken the criminal activity. Id.; see also Hall, supra note 2 at 528
(suggesting one goal of forfeiting proceeds from criminal activity is removal of any
economic benefit to criminal activity).
2 Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2152 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
' Id. at 2153.
"4 Id. Justice Thomas also has expressed concern over the scope of 21 U.S.C. §
881(a)(7).
Ilt is unclear whether the central theory behind in rem forfeiture, the fic-
tion "that the thing is primarily considered the offender," can fully justify
the immense scope of § 881(a)(7).... Given that current practice under §
881(a)(7) appears to be far removed from the legal fiction upon which the
civil forfeiture doctrine is based, it may be necessary-in an appropriate
case-to reevaluate our generally deferential approach to legislative judg-
ments in this area of civil forfeiture.
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 82 (1993)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted) (analyzing
section 881 civil forfeiture action under Due Process Clause).
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acterized as remedial, but rather was excessive and intended to
be retributive. Consequently, the Court should have reversed
Ursery's criminal conviction, as this prosecution constituted a
second "punishment" in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
With respect to the $405,089.23 seized and forfeited by Arlt
and Wren, it is submitted that such forfeiture did not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause. More specifically, the forfeiture of pro-
ceeds may fairly be characterized as a remedial mechanism, as
the forfeiture of proceeds merely placed the individuals back into
the position they would have been in had they not undertaken
the unlawful activity in the first place, thereby preventing unjust
enrichment. With respect to the contraband, it also is urged that
this forfeiture did not violate double jeopardy because "it ex-
act[ed] no price in liberty or lawfully derived property" from the
defendants." As this analysis suggests, not all forfeiture stat-
utes are identical; indeed, an application of the same forfeiture
statute may require different results depending upon the cir-
cumstances. Nevertheless, in Ursery, the Court explicitly re-
jected the application of Halper and Austin in the in rem civil
forfeiture context."
The Ursery Court distinguished Halper by reasoning that
the decision applied only to in personam civil penalties.87 By
"cabining" s the Halper holding, the Court rendered the Halper
test inapplicable to an in rem civil forfeiture action and thereby
affirmed the test of 89 Firearms as controlling.89 Similarly, the
Court distinguished Austin as irrelevant for purposes of a double
jeopardy inquiry because the Amendment at issue in Austin was
the Excessive Fines Clause, not the Double Jeopardy Clause. °
"5 Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2151 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
8' Id. at 2144-47.
8' Id. at 2144.
8' Id. at 2156 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89 Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2142. Recall that the 89 Firearms test asks whether
Congress intended the forfeiture as a civil remedy, and, if it did, whether the defen-
dant can demonstrate by "the clearest proof" that the statutory scheme is so puni-
tive as to negate Congress' intention to create a civil remedial sanction. See United
States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362-66 (1984). It is argued
that such a test places an undue burden on a defendant to show by the "clearest
proof" that Congress' scheme is punitive, and is unfair because it does not examine
the particular facts giving rise to the forfeiture.
" Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147 ("[Wle decline to import the [Excessive Fines
Clause] analysis of Austin into our double jeopardy jurisprudence.").
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Consequently, the Court reasoned that its earlier finding under
Austin, that civil forfeiture "punished" a defendant, was inap-
propriate for a double jeopardy case.9
These distinctions are specious. The Halper decision does
not require an interpretation that its holding be limited to in
personam civil penalties. An examination of the language of
Halper reveals the use of the term "civil sanction," as opposed to
in personam civil penalty.92 Moreover, the primary justification
offered for treating in personam and in rem civil penalties differ-
ently seems unconvincing. Specifically, the Court maintained
that because in rem actions proceed against the property, a per-
son cannot be "punished" because it was the property which was
"punished" as the wrongdoer.93 This resort to legal fiction is
flawed because it elevates form over substance by failing to ac-
count for the reality of in rem forfeiture actions-namely, that
civil forfeiture often does punish the owner of the property.94
Moreover, the Court's reasoning that Austin was inapplica-
ble,95 as it examined the issue of "punishment" for purposes of
review under the Excessive Fines Clause, should be rejected be-
cause it requires that the same statute considered punitive un-
der the Eight Amendment now be considered remedial under the
Fifth Amendment. How can the same statute the Court unani-
9' Id. at 2147.
92 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989) ("We therefore hold that
under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a
criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the ex-
tent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial .... ")
(emphasis added). There is, however, dicta in the Ursery case which states that this
is a rule for "the rare case", i.e., a fixed-penalty case. Id. at 435.
Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2144-45. The Court further opined that "itjhe narrow fo-
cus of Halper followed from the distinction that we have drawn historically between
civil forfeiture and civil penalties. Since at least Various Items, we have [held that]
... in an in rem forfeiture proceeding, 'it is the property which is proceeded against,
and by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and condemned.' " Id. (citing Various
Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 580-81 (1931)).
9 See, e.g., Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2151 (citing United States v. United States
Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 718 (1971)) (espousing that owner feels pain and
stigma of the forfeiture, not the loss of property); Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2161
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that "formalistic
distinctions that obscure the obvious practical consequences of governmental action
disserve the 'humane interests' protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause") (citations
omitted).
" The Court, although applying the 89 Firearms test, needed to distinguish
Halper under the second prong in order to conclude the statute did not impart
"punishment" on the defendants. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2146.
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mously labeled punitive in Austin now suddenly be characterized
as remedial under Ursery?
III. THE HALPER TEST
Even if the Court correctly construed Halper as applying
only to in personam civil penalties, a comparison of the 89 Fire-
arms test and the Halper test demonstrates that the better rule
in cases of in rem civil penalties is nevertheless that of the
Halper proportionality analysis. In comparing these two tests, it
should be noted that the second prong of the 89 Firearms test is
nearly identical to that of the Halper test, except for a variation
in burdens. Under the second prong of 89 Firearms, a court
must find by the "clearest of proof' that the statute operates pu-
natively.96 In contrast, a court following Halper asks whether
the statute "may not fairly be characterized as remedial." 7
Thus, although the question asked by each test is the same, i.e.,
whether the statute is punitive or remedial, the second prong of
89 Firearms is more difficult to meet because it places on defen-
dants a greater burden to show by the "clearest of proof" that the
statute is not primarily a remedial mechanism.98
The basic purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to pro-
tect individuals against Government imposition of multiple
punishments for the same offense.99 Accordingly, it is argued
that application of the 89 Firearms test is inconsistent with the
aims of double jeopardy because it impermissibly places on indi-
viduals the burden of establishing the punitive nature of a civil
forfeiture statute.' 0 That burden should be placed on the gov-
ernment.
On the other hand, Halper could be interpreted for the op-
posite proposition, namely that any civil statute that does not
operate as "solely remedial" is punitive.' Although such an in-
" United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362-66 (1984);
see also supra note 89 and accompanying text (touching on "clearest-proof' test).
9' United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989).
98 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 365 (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249
(1980)).
See supra note 55-57 and accompanying text.
100 See Anderson, supra note 4, at 549 (describing 89 Firearms position as ex-
treme).
'0' See, e.g., United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1222 (9th
Cir. 1994), amended on denial of reh'g en banc, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995) (adopting
"solely remedial" Halper rule to invalidate civil forfeiture), rev'd sub nom. United
States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
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terpretation would be most consistent with double jeopardy ju-
risprudence law because it would invalidate any civil sanction
serving any punitive purpose, it is urged that this interpretation
should be discarded."2 This is because virtually every forfeiture
statute would then be deemed punitive, and more importantly,
Halper itself does not take such a restrictive view.' ° Instead,
Halper utilizes a proportionality test which seems to fairly bal-
ance both the Government's interests and the individual's consti-
tutional protections.
There is, moreover, even less justification for applying the
first prong of the 89 Firearms test, as it creates a presumption
that a statute labeled as civil by Congress is in fact remedial.'
By placing this hurdle in a defendant's path, the Ursery Court
again endorses a formalistic view by permitting a Congressional
label on a statute to enjoy a presumption against constitutional
challenge. A court should attribute less deference to Congress'
intent and more deference to the practical effect a statute has on
individuals.
Finally, by endorsing the bright-line test of 89 Firearms, the
Court effectively creates a per se rule that civil forfeiture never
violates double jeopardy."5 In the process, the Ursery Court
102 United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2145-46 n.2 (1996) (noting that
"solely remedial" language of Halper would require virtually every civil sanction to
be deemed "punishment" as "it is hard to imagine a sanction that has no punitive
aspect whatsoever"). Such an interpretation would also be erroneous because the
Halper case itself does not base its decision on the "solely remedial" test, but rather
on a proportionality analysis. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 452 (concluding "that the dis-
parity between its approximation of the Governments costs and Halper's $130,000
liability is sufficiently disproportionate that the sanction constitutes a second pun-
ishment in violation of double jeopardy ....") (emphasis added). But see Subin, supra
note 4, at 268-70 (arguing that proportionality test is unfair and unworkable).
103 See Halper, 490 U.S. at 449 (noting dispositive test is whether "the second
sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial...").
104 Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147-48.
10" Even the Court seems to recognize this flaw of the 89 Firearms test. See id.
at 2148, n.3 (denying "that in rem civil forfeiture is per se exempt from ... the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause."). The courts that have considered double jeopardy challenges
in the civil forfeiture context after Ursery have indeed rejected such claims. See, e.g.,
United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 814 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding forfeiture of
driving privileges does not violate Double Jeopardy Clause under Ursery ); United
States v. Guest, No. 95-6428, 1996 WL 537926, at *1 (10th Cir. Sept. 24, 1996)
(stating claim of civil forfeiture as violating Double Jeopardy Clause is nearly fore-
closed by Ursery); United States v. Brophil, 96 F.3d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying
Ursery and dismissing Double Jeopardy claim); United States v. Sardone, 94 F.3d
1233, 1235-36 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. $187,917.00 U.S. Currency,
No. 95-3171, 1196 WL 376920 (7th Cir, July 2, 1996) (invoking 89 Firearms test in
1997]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tramples a constitutional right by placing an insurmountable
barrier in front of all double jeopardy claims involving civil for-
feiture. The Halper proportionality test, in contrast, recognizes
that certain civil forfeitures may violate double jeopardy if the
statute may not fairly be characterized as remedial. Thus, the
Halper proportionality test, because it doesn't foreclose constitu-
tional challenges, is a better test; one that balances the interests
served by civil sanctions against the protection from multiple-
punishment contained in the Double Jeopardy Clause.
CONCLUSION
It has been submitted that the Supreme Court erred in fail-
ing to adopt the Halper proportionality test in Ursery. The ar-
guments offered by the Court in distinguishing Halper and Aus-
tin are unconvincing. By creating different rules for in rem and
in personam actions, the Court only perpetuates the legal fiction
that in rem actions do not "punish" a defendant because the ac-
tion proceeds against the property. Even if Halper properly can
be distinguished from Ursery, it is suggested that perhaps it
should not be. The Halper test can be universally applied to all
civil sanctions with the knowledge that it comports with the
limitations contained in the Constitution on the power to punish.
Although Halper requires a court to undertake a more demand-
ing analysis than the bright-line rule of 89 Firearms, it more ef-
fectively balances the interests of prosecutorial access to civil
sanctions against an important constitutional right.
For these reasons, it is urged that the Supreme Court re-
consider its position and overrule Ursery.
Adam C. Wells
accordance with Ursery to deny double jeopardy claim).
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